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Union Duty of Fair Representation: The Timeliness
Issue in Light of United Parcel Service, Inc. v.
Mitchell
The Supreme Court of the United States in Steele v. Louisville &
Northern Railroad' held that unions have a judicially enforceable re-
sponsibility to represent their members with fairness and impartial-
ity. Since that decision, the Court has expanded this judicial
doctrine, reflecting the growth and development of labor law. Un-
ions have become in many instances the exclusive representatives of
their members. The fair representation doctrine is thus the sole ave-
nue by which employees may protect their individual rights. The
Supreme Court noted this importance in Vaca v. Sibes,2 where it de-
clared that the "duty of fair representation has stood as a bulwark to
prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of
traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law."
'3
If a union fails in this judicially prescribed duty, the injured em-
ployee may bring a fair representation suit against the union. How-
ever, conflict has arisen in the federal courts concerning the
appropriate statute of limitations for this action.4 In United Parcel Serv-
ice, Inc. v. Mitchell,5 the Supreme Court dealt with an employee's suit
charging his employer with wrongful discharge and his union with
breach of its fair representation duty. But the Mitchell decision has
not abated the conflict in the federal courts surrounding the fair rep-
resentation timeliness issue.
This note examines the timeliness question in light of the
1 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
2 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
3 Id at 182. The Court explained the fair representation doctrine as follows: "Under
this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a desig-
nated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostil-
ity or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and
honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Id. at 177. In this note the phrases "fair represen-
tation claim" and "fair representation doctrine" refer to this judicially created duty with
which the unions have been charged.
4 See, e.g., Flowers v. Local 2602, United Steelworkers of America, 671 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 81-2408); Delcostello v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, 524 F.Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1981), afd, 679 F.2d879 (4th
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 81-2386). See also notes
64-69 and 75-80 infra and accompanying text.
5 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
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Mitchell decision. Part I describes the fair representation doctrine.
Part II discusses the Mitchell holding and its implications for resolu-
tion of the timeliness question. Part III evaluates the federal courts'
interpretation of Mitchell in determining the appropriate statute of
limitations for the claim against the union. Part IV analyzes how the
timeliness determination affects the policies underlying labor law
and proposes a clarification of the Mitchell holding.
I. The Fair Representation Doctrine
The fair representation doctrine originated in Steele v. Louisville
&Northern Railroad,6 a 1944 Supreme Court decision, and was devel-
oped to combat racial discrimination which Railway Labor Act bar-
gaining representatives allegedly practiced. 7 The doctrine quickly
enveloped unions certified under the National Labor Relations Act. 8
Unions with exclusive statutory authority to represent their members
are charged with the duty to represent all their members fairly and
responsibly.9
Courts have embellished this doctrine of 'judicial cognizance"' 0
over the last several decades, corresponding with the considerable
growth in labor law. In Humphrey v. Moore," the Supreme Court
characterized the plaintiff's fair representation claim against his
union as one arising under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA),12 thus controlled by federal law. 13 Section
6 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (suit for damages under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
188 (1976)).
7 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177.
8 Id. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The Court discussed the
historical development of the doctrine in Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177:
[t]he statutory duty of fair representation was developed over 20 years ago in a
series of cases involving alleged racial discrimination by unions certified as exclusive
bargaining representatives under the Railway Labor Act, see Steele v. Louisville &
N. R. Co., 323 U.S. [at] 192; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323
U.S. [at] 210, and was soon extended to unions certified under the N.L.R.A., see
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, [345 U.S. at 330].
9 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177.
10 Steele, 323 U.S. at 207. "In the absence of any available administrative remedy, the
right here asserted, to a remedy for breach of the statutory duty of the bargaining representa-
tive to represent and act for the members of a craft, is of judicial cognizance." Id.
11 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
12 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The Act reads in pertinent part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
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301 of the LMRA grants federal courts power to enforce contracts
between labor organizations and employers. As the Court explained
in Vaca v. Szbes,' 4 provisions such as section 301 endorse employee
organization and collective bargaining as an efficient means of effect-
ing better working conditions, higher wages and overall "industrial
peace."1 5 Acknowledging these goals, the federal courts give great
deference to collective bargaining contracts and attendant arbitra-
tion awards.1 6 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stressed that a
union's responsibility to its members-its duty of fair representa-
tion-increases along with its accession to representative power.
17
Pursuant to section 301, either the employee or his union may
bring a wrongful discharge or other work-related claim against the
employer.' 8 Since Republic Steel v. Maddox,19 however, the Supreme
Court has required that an aggrieved employee must first attempt to
pursue the grievance procedure for which the employer and union
have contracted.20 So, while an employee may rightfully sue his em-
ployer under section 301, the employer may have a defense based on
the employee's failure to exhaust the exclusive remedies provided in
the collective bargaining contract. 2' In Vaca v. Sipes,22 the Supreme
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgement
against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforce-
able only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not
be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
Moore charged his union with dishonest conduct for its participation in a Joint Confer-
ence Committee decision to dovetail seniority lists of two companies, a decision which ulti-
mately caused Moore's discharge. Moore, 375 U.S. at 342.
13 375 U.S. at 343-44. In characterizing Moore's claim as one arising under § 301, the
Court acknowledged that "there are differing views on whether a violation of the duty of fair
representation is an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act," but
found it unnecessary to resolve that difference. Id. at 344. So, while the Court considered the
fair representation claim to be a matter of federal law, the Court did not clearly explicate the
precise statutory source of this cause of action.
14 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
15 Id. at 182.
16 See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554,561-63 (1976) (courts should not
rule on the merits of arbitration settlements, but rather should defer to the system for dispute
resolution which the parties themselves have agreed upon).
17 Id. at 564.
18 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 183. See also Hines, 424 U.S. at 562.
19 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
20 Id. at 652.
21 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184.
22 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
[April 1983]
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Court extended the fair representation doctrine to cover the situation
in which a union has, by contract, the sole power to invoke the
higher stages of the grievance procedure and has wrongfully refused
to process the employee's grievance, preventing him from exhausting
his contractual remedies.2 3 If both elements are present, the em-
ployee may seek enforcement of his rights despite the exclusivity of
the collective bargaining agreement provisions.
24
Nonetheless, the courts generally defer to arbitration awards,
and they do not demand that the grievance processes be error free.
25
A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs "only
when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargain-
ing unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. ' 26 It is this
breach which undermines the integrity of the arbitral process and
removes the bar of the contract finality provisions.2 7 The employee is
free to sue his employer for breach of the contract and his union for
breach of its fair representation duty. Cognizant that the employee
in this situation is suing for two discrete wrongs, the Supreme Court
has directed that courts apportion liability between the employer
and the union according to the damage which each has caused. 28
23 Id. at 185.
24 Id. See also Hines, 424 U.S. at 567. In Vaca the Court allowed that the union's breach
might be termed an unfair labor practice:
We may assume for present purposes that such a breach of duty by the union is an
unfair labor practice, as the NLRB and the Fifth Circuit have held. The em-
ployee's suit against the employer, however, remains a §301 suit, and the jurisdic-
tion of the courts is no more destroyed by the fact that the employee, as part and
parcel of his § 301 action, finds it necessary to prove an unfair labor practice by the
union, than it is by the fact that the suit may involve an unfair labor practice by
the employer himself.
386 U.S. at 186. Yet the Court stated that the claim against the union remained a § 301 suit
regardless of whether the employee joined the union as a defendant. Id. Compare the Court's
statement in Hines that Vaca rejected the assertion "that the alleged conduct was arguably an
unfair practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Board. Hines, 424 U.S. at
566.
25 Hines, 424 U.S. at 571.
26 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.
27 Congress, in approving collective bargaining arrangements, intended that the system
function with integrity. In allowing unions to represent their members, the courts charged
them with a great responsibility to represent their members with care. The courts recognize
that employees must depend on their unions-often the only source of representation in griev-
ance procedures--to carry out their duty of fair representation. If unions breach their duty,
then judicial deference to the arbitration process becomes unwarranted. See Hines, 424 U.S.
at 567.
28 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197. "Thus, damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of
contract should not be charged to the union, but increases, if any, in those damages caused by
the union's refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the employer." Id. at
197-98. "Even though both the employer and the union have caused the damage suffered by
NOTES
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II. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell
Since its decision in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp. (Hoosier
Cardinal),29 the Supreme Court has directed that the federal courts
determine the timeliness of a section 301 suit "as a matter of federal
law, by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations. '30
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not offer any further guidance
as to what constitutes the "appropriate" statute of limitations for a
fair representation suit against a union until United Parcel Service, Inc.
v. Mitchell,3' a 1981 decision.
Mitchell involved an employee's claims against his employer for
wrongful termination 32 and his union for breach of its fair represen-
tation duty,33 a grievance which Justice Rehnquist characterized in
the majority opinion as a "fairly mundane and discrete wrongful-
discharge complaint." 34 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York granted the union's and employer's
motions for summary judgment on the ground that New York's
ninety-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration
awards governed the action and it was therefore time-barred. But
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
applying New York's six-year statute of limitations for breach of con-
tract actions as the more appropriate timeliness rule.35 The Supreme
Court of the United States granted the employer's petition for
certiorari.
the employee, the union is responsible for the increase in damages and, as between the two
wrongdoers, should bear its portion of the damages." Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 51
U.S.L.W. 4051, 4054 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983)(citation omitted).
29 383 U.S. 696 (1966)(union action against employer brought under § 301 of the LMRA
to recover employees' vacation pay).
30 Id. at 705 (citation omitted). The Court explained that for over one hundred years it
had looked to relevant state statutes of limitations when Congress had provided none.
"Against this background, we cannot take the omission in the present statute to judicially
devise a uniform time limitation for § 301 suits." Id. at 704.
31 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
32 Id. at 59. Mitchell alleged that U.P.S. had discharged him "not for the stated reasons,
which it knew to be false, but to achieve savings by replacing full-time employees with part-
time employees." Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 63-64.
35 624 F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit observed that
the characterization of § 301 actions such as the instant one as actions "to vacate
arbitration awards" is not even conceptually sound. First, an action to vacate an
arbitration award under New York law may not be instituted by discharged em-
ployees like appellant . . . Second, a § 301 action is procedurally quite distinct
from an action to vacate or modify an arbitration award.
[April 1983]
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Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist examined the na-
ture of Mitchell's federal claim, finding that it more closely resem-
bled a suit to vacate an arbitration award than a straight contract
action. 36 Justice Rehnquist then noted that Hoosier Cardinal recog-
nized the "relatively rapid disposition of labor disputes" as one of the
leading federal policies in labor law.3 7 Acknowledging that the
Court had committed itself to selecting a limitations rule from some-
what ill fitting state law, and recognizing the undesirability of pro-
longing established grievance and arbitral procedures, the Mitchell
majority affirmed the district court's imposition of New York's
ninety-day limitations period for an action to vacate an arbitration
award.38
Technically, this holding did not pertain to Mitchell's action
against the union, for only the employer's claim was before the
Court.39 Nevertheless, the majority opinion discussed the appropri-
ate timeliness rule for the fair representation claim, as did Justices
Stewart and Stevens in their separate opinions.
Justice Rehnquist stated that an employee's fair representation
claim against his union is more a creature of the developing body of
"labor law" than it is of contract law, notwithstanding the em-
ployer's possible liability if the employee is ultimately successful. 40
The majority opinion declined to consider the amicus argument that
the Court should apply the six-month limitations rule in section
10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)41 to so-called
"hybrid" section 301 breach of duty actions--claims brought by em-
ployees against both their union and employer.42 Additionally, the
36 Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 63.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 64.
39 Id. at 71-72 & n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Only the employer asked
the Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision in this case.
40 Id. at 63.
41 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). This section provides in part:
(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any
such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the
Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such
person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of
hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or
agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said
complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor
practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the
Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge
is made. . ..
Id (emphasis in original).
42 Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 60 n.2.
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majority opinion, in dicta, rejected Mitchell's argument that his hy-
brid action might be characterized as a tort governed by New York's
three-year statute of limitations.
43
Justice Stewart founded his concurrence in the Mitchell judg-
ment upon a different theory than that which the majority em-
ployed. Noting that the Supreme Court's opinion in Hoosier
Cardinal44 allowed for the possibility of other rules on timeliness,
45
Justice Stewart advocated the limitations period in section 10(b) of
the NLRA as the appropriate rule for hybrid section 301 lawsuits.46
According to Justice Stewart, Mitchell had two claims with separate
jurisdictional bases;47 the claim against the employer arose under sec-
tion 301, but the fair representation claim derived from the NLRA.48
Nevertheless, he thought that the hybrid claims were "inextricably
interdependent. '49 Justice Stewart maintained that Congress estab-
lished the section 10(b) limitations period to achieve "the proper bal-
ance between the national interests in stable bargaining relationships
and finality of private settlements, and an employee's interest in set-
43 Id. at 62-63 n.4. The majority opinion stated,
Respondent suggests Hines' actions might also be characterized as actions upon a
statute, personal injury actions, or malpractice actions. . . . All of these character-
izations suffer from the same flaw as the effort to characterize the action as one for
breach of contract: they overlook the fact that an arbitration award stands between
the employee and any relief which may be awarded against the company.
Id
44 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
45 Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 65, 70 (Stewart, J., concurring). "Whether other § 301 suits dif-
ferent from the present one might call for the application of other rules on timeliness, we are
not required to decide, and we indicate no view whatsoever on that question." Hoosier Cardi-
nal, 383 U.S. at 705 n.7.
46 Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 65, 70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 66 (Stewart, J., concurring).
48 Id (Stewart, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 66-67 (Stewart, J., concurring). Apparently Justice Stewart deemed the separate
jurisdictional bases of the hybrid claims to be relatively unimportant in the determination of
the appropriate statute of limitations for the claims. Rather, he emphasized the close connec-
tion between the two actions as a justification for applying a uniform federal timeliness rule to
both claims. Justice Stewart maintained that the Court was not bound to look to state stat-
utes of limitations in these cases. He asserted that the limitations period in § 10(b) of the
NLRA was the most appropriate statute of limitations for the hybrid claims. Central to this
assertion was Justice Stewart's characterization of the fair representation claim as an unfair
labor practice. He noted that "[t]his Court has not decided whether all breaches of the duty
of fair representation necessarily constitute unfair labor practices under §§ 8(b)(a)(A) and
(b)(2) of the NLRA. . . . [But] a majority of the Courts of Appeals have concluded that
breach of the fair representation duty is an unfair labor practice." He added that even if
some fair representation claims could not be characterized as unfair labor practices, the
§ 10(b) rule would still be the most appropriate, because "that limitations period is a clear
indication of Congress' judgment of when claims of a very similar or identical character must
be brought." Id at 67-68 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[April 19831
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ting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective-
bargaining system." 50 In view of this clear congressional intent and
the interdependence of the hybrid section 301 actions, Justice
Stewart believed that both claims should be governed by the uniform
federal timeliness rule.
5t
Justice Stevens, concurring in part with and dissenting in part
from the Mitchell decision, feared that the majority's failure to ex-
pressly limit its reasoning might imply that the Court had also de-
cided the same statute of limitations governs an employee's fair
representation claim against his union.52 Such a broad interpreta-
tion, according to Justice Stevens, would be both inconsistent with
the posture of the case and conceptually unsound. 53 Unlike Justice
Stewart, Justice Stevens viewed the employee's claims against his em-
ployer and union in a section 301 hybrid action as "conceptually dis-
tinct.' ' 54 Justice Stevens rejected the view that an employee's claim
against his union for breaching its fair representation duty is analo-
gous to an action to vacate an arbitration award, because the arbitra-
tion proceeding would never determine the union's liability to the
employee. 55 Rather, Justice Stevens maintained that the employee's
claim against the union is more properly characterized as a malprac-
tice claim. 5  And he stressed that the fair representation claim may
50 Id. at 70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 70-71 (Stewart, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 72 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
53 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
54 Id. at 73 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Stevens stressed that the fair
representation claim could stand independent of the disposition of the employee's claim
against his employer. The fair representation claim stems from the union's tort-like fiduciary
duty to its members. Therefore, this claim arises from a different theoretical basis than that
on which the employee's work-related claim against his employer is based.
55 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens ex-
plained, "By its very nature, the employee's claim that the union breached its duty of fair
representation cannot be resolved in an arbitration proceeding because it arises out of the
conduct of that proceeding itself." Id. at 73 n.3. He added:
While an arbitration decision favorable to the employer-for example, that the
discharge did not breach the collective-bargaining agreement-would be of sub-
stantial significance in an employee's suit against his union, it would not necessarily
be dispositive. The determination whether the employer breached the agreement
may be highly relevant to the amount of damages caused by the union's alleged
breach of duty, but it is not necessarily controlling with respect to the threshold
question whether there was any breach of duty by the union at all.
Id. at 73 n.4.
56 Id. at 74 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Stewart analogized the fair
representation claim to the situation in which a lawyer has negligently allowed the statute of
limitations to bar his client's cause of action. The attorney may be liable to his client on the
claim despite the original defendant's valid statute of limitations defense.
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even survive if a court deems the arbitration award conclusive as to
the employer's obligations.
57
While he agreed with the Court's choice of limitations statute
against the employer in Mitchell, Justice Stevens refused to accept the
same timeliness statute for the claim against the union.58 Justice
Stevens did not decide what statute of limitations would be appropri-
ate for the latter claim.59 However, he apparently rejected Justice
Stewart's proposal that the Court "strain" to conclude that Congress
intended section 10(b) of the NLRA to control causes of action which
the Court had not yet divined when section 10(b) was enacted.6°
III. The Federal Courts' Interpretation of Mitchell
Only the employee's claim against his employer was before the
Court in Mitchell. Thus, the Courts of Appeals have recognized that
the Mitchell decision does not control their determination of the ap-
propriate statute of limitations for an employee's cause of action
based on the fair representation doctrine.61 Yet in resolving their
timeliness issues for employee-union actions, the Courts of Appeals
57 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). See note 54 supra.
58 Id. at 74-75 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
59 Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Yet Justice Stevens observed:
Under the rationale of Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-
705, arguably the proper statute of limitations to apply to such a claim would be N.
Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214 (6) (McKinney 1972), which governs claims for nonmedi-
cal malpractice. Because the question of the appropriate statute of limitations to
apply to the employee's claim against his union is not properly presented in this
case, I express no definite opinion on that point. I note, however, that the Court
dismisses the suggestion that this action may be characterized as a malpractice ac-
tion with the observation that this characterization "overlook[s] the fact that an
arbitration award stands between the employee and any relief which may be
awarded against the company." [451 U.S. at 63 n.4](emphasis supplied). Because no
arbitration award stands between the employee and any relief which may be
awarded against the union, this observation is inapplicable to the claim against the
union.
Id at 75 n.7. See note 43 supra.
60 Id. at 75-76 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Stevens also observed:
The plain language of this statute [§ 10(b)] indicates that it is directed solely to the
administrative procedure established by Congress in the National Labor Relations
Act for the resolution of unfair labor practice charges arising under, and processed
in accordance with, that Act. Nothing in the statutory language suggests that Con-
gress intended that this 6-month limitations period be applied in any other context.
Id at 76 n.8.
61 Lawson v. Local, Nos. 81-3722, 81-3540, slip op. at 5 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 1983); Hand v.
International Chem. Workers Union, 681 F. 2d 1308, 1309, reh'gen banc ordered, 681 F. 2d 1313
(11 th Cir. 1982); Flowers v. Local 2602, United Steelworkers of America, 671 F.2d 87, 89 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3404 (Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 81-2408); Sear v. Cadillac Auto
Co. of Boston, 654 F.2d 4, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1981).
[April 1983]
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have turned to the Supreme Court for guidance. Because Mitchell is
the only decision which addresses the union claim question, 62 some
circuits have attempted to apply the majority opinion while other
circuits have adopted the views of either Justice Stewart or Justice
Stevens.
63
A. The Mitchell Majority Opinion Applied to the Fair Representation
Claim
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth64 and
Sixth 65 Circuits have held that the Mitchell holding determines the
timeliness question in fair representation suits. 66 Central to this in-
62 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari for two cases which conflict on the
timeliness issue for fair representation claims. See note 4 supra.
63 The First, Third, Eighth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits have not clearly ruled on the timeli-
ness issue for the fair representation claim since the Mitchell decision.
64 Delcostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md.
1981), afd, 679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Nov. 29,
1982) (No. 81-2386). This case involved an employee's claims against his employer for wrong-
ful termination and his local and international unions for breach of their duty of fair repre-
sentation. Id at 722. The court stated that "[a]lthough only the employer was before the
Court [in Mitchell], it is reasonably clear from the Supreme Court's opinion that the short
limitations period would apply to a companion action against a union for breach of the duty
of fair representation." Id The court applied the thirty-day statute of limitations attendant
to Maryland's statute for vacating arbitration awards to all the employee's claims in this case.
65 Lawson v. Local, Nos. 81-3722, 81-3540, slip op. (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 1983). This decision
involved two separate fair representation claims against unions under § 301. Plaintiff Law-
son's claim was solely against his union, while Plaintiff Leach also brought a claim against his
employer for wrongful discharge. The court applied the Ohio ninety-day statute of limita-
tions to all three claims; all three actions were time-barred. Id. at 2-3. See also Badon v.
General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1982).
66 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Mitchell
holding retroactively in Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981), but
the court announced that in future cases "as Mitchell requires, when the action is commenced
after an unfavorable arbitral decision, we shall treat suits against a union for breach of the
duty of fair representation and against an employer for a breach of a collective bargaining
agreement under this type of [vacation of arbitration award] limitations statute." Id at 1353.
However, in Washington v. Northland Marine Co., Inc., 681 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), the
court applied the Washington state three-year tort statute of limitations to an employees'
action against their local and international unions for breach of the unions' duty of fair repre-
sentation. According to the court in Washington, Mitchell allows the federal courts freedom to
characterize actions as they deem appropriate. The courts then apply the relevant state stat-
ute of limitations. Id at 585. In Washington, the court characterized the unions'.alleged mis-
conduct as violative of the employees' "personal, legal right to representation." Id at 586.
This characterization indicated that the lawsuit was one for "injury to the person or rights of
another" under Washington law. Although the court ultimately applied the tort statute of
limitations, the court's opinion in Washington indicates that selection of the same limitations
period for the claims against the employer and union is desirable, if not mandated by
Mitchell: "application of the three-year statute of limitations will promote uniformity in the
limitations period applicable against unions and employers." Id
NOTES
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terpretation is the courts' recognition of the close connection between
the employee's claims against his employer and union.67 Addition-
ally, the Fourth Circuit has explicitly asserted that selection of the
same timeliness rule for the actions would not substantially burden
the plaintiff.6 Although both circuits have held that Mitchell man-
dates their application of the same limitations period to both actions,
the Sixth Circuit apparently believes that this policy does not require
it to apply the statute controlling suits to vacate arbitration awards.
69
B. Limitations Rule in Section 10(b) of the NLRA Applied to the Fair
Representation Claim
Concurring in the Mitchell judgment, Justice Stewart advocated
a uniform federal limitations rule for an employee's fair representa-
tion claim against his union.70 In a recent decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted Justice Stewart's proposal that the six-month statute of
limitations in section 10(b) of the NLRA govern an employee's fair
representation claim. 7 1 However, the court followed the Mitchell ma-
67 Velcostello, 524 F. Supp. at 725 ("Joint presentation and trial of the two claims is virtu-
ally compelled by the nature of the concomitant actions against the employer and union in
301 cases").
One must wonder how committed the Sixth Circuit is to this interpretation, however,
despite that court's precedent. In Lawson the court said:
Although, as Justice Stevens points out in his concurring opinion in Mitchell, the
two causes of action conceptually are based on somewhat different theories, Badon
[679 F.2d 93] and Gallagher [613 F.2d 67] are the law of this Circuit until overruled
or reversed, and they require application of the same limitations statute to both
types of actions-the wrongful discharge claim against the employer and the unfair
representation claim against the union.
Nos. 81-3722, 81-3540, slip. op. at 5 (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, in Badon, the Sixth Circuit explained a further justification for applying the
same limitations period to both employee claims. Since, in the Sixth Circuit, an employee
may not recover lost wages, lost benefits or punitive damages in a fair representation claim
against a union, "[i]t would be contrary to sound judicial policy to encourage actions to
recover only the costs of litigation where no underlying right can any longer be vindicated in
the action." 679 F.2d at 98.
68 Delcostello, 524 F. Supp. at 725.
69 Significantly, in Newton v. Local 801 Frigidaire Local, 684 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1982),
the court said that it has found that an action by an employee against a union "for breach of
duty of fair representation sounds in tort rather than in contract." Id at 403. In Newton the
Sixth Circuit applied Ohio's six-year limitation period for actions based on liabilities created
by statute to the employees for representation claims. See also the discussion of the Ninth
Circuit's approach to the timeliness issue in note 66 supra.
70 See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text.
71 Hall v. Local 2, Printing & Graphic Arts Union, No. 82-1109, slip. op. (7th Cir. Dec.
29, 1982).
The plaintiff in Hall brought suit against her employer for wrongful termination and
against her local and international unions for breach of their duty of fair representation.
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jority opinion in its treatment of the action against the employer,
applying the ninety-day limitations statute in the Illinois Arbitration
Act to that claim. 72 The Seventh Circuit thus discounted the impor-
tance of uniformity in the statutes of limitations for hybrid claims.
The court's paramount considerations in ruling on the timeliness is-
sue were its characterization of a fair representation suit as an unfair
labor practice, 73 and its recognition of the federal labor policy which
"strongly favors prompt resolution of labor disputes. ' 74
C. Selection of the Relevant State Tort Timeliness Rule for the Fair
Representation Claim
Three United States Courts of Appeals have recognized that the
Mitchell holding does not apply to an employee's claim against his
union.75 Consequently, the Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have
rejected limitations rules attendant to statutes for vacation of arbitra-
tion decrees. 76 Instead, the courts, focusing on the tort-like qualities
of the fair representation claim, have looked to relevant state tort
statutes of limitations as the appropriate approach for determining
the timeliness of these claims. 77 This is the same approach that
Justice Stevens proposed in Mitchell..78
In adopting this approach, all three circuits have emphasized
the independent nature of an employee's claims against his union
Treating her claims separately, the Seventh Circuit ruled that her claims against the em-
ployer and local were time barred, while her claim against the international union lacked
merit.
72 Id at 4.
73 "[A]t least for purposes of choosing a limitations rule, an unfair representation suit in
federal court is certainly analogous in nature to an unfair labor practice complaint before the
National Labor Relations Board." Id at 8.
74 Id at 9.
75 See Hand v. International Chem. Workers Union, 681 F.2d 1308, 1309, reh'g en bane
ordered, 681 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1982); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 678 F. 2d 1276,
1284 (5th Cir. 1982); Flowers v. Local 3602 of United Steel Workers, 671 F. 2d 87, 89 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 81-2408). The Second Circuit
recently reaffirmed the Flowers holding in Assad v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 82-725 1, slip op.
2279, 2294 (2d Cir. March 9, 1983).
76 See Hand, 681 F.2d at 1312; Edwards, 678 F. 2d at 1284; Flowers, 671 F. 2d at 89, 90.
77 In Flowers, two employees brought a suit under § 301 of the LMRA charging their
employer with wrongful discharge and their local union with breach of its duty of fair repre-
sentation. 671 F.2d at 88. The court selected New York's three-year nonmedical malpractice
statute of limitations as the most appropriate timeliness rule. Id at 91.
The Fifth Circuit deemed the Texas two-year tort limitations statute to be appropriate
for a breach of duty of fair representation in Edwards. 678 F.2d at 1292.
In Hand, the Eleventh Circuit concurred in the Flowers decision and adopted a four-year
tort statute of limitations for the fair representation claim. 681 F.2d at 1313.
78 See notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text.
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and employer. 79 Additionally, the Second and Fifth Circuits have
explicitly rejected Justice Stewart's suggestion that the section 10(b)
limitations rule is appropriate for a fair representation claim.8 0
IV. The Timeliness Determination and Policies Underlying
Labor Law: A Proposed Clarification of Mitchell
The above discussion illuminates the varied approaches federal
courts are taking in determining the timeliness of an employee's fair
representation action against his union. The courts' opinions reveal
a common judicial concern that the statute of limitations which is
selected leaves basic labor law policies undisturbed.
A. Fundamental Policies of Labor Law
In developing its fair representation doctrine, the Supreme
Court has striven to promote three fundamental labor law policies.
These considerations have significantly influenced the justices' ap-
proaches to the timeliness issue in fair representation actions, and in
turn these policies play a significant role in the lower federal courts'
timeliness determinations.
1. Viable and Final Dispute Settlements
Both Congress and the Supreme Court view organized, collec-
tive bargaining as an important mechanism for intertwining the in-
terests of employees, unions and employers, thereby producing a
strong system of labor.81 Thus, the Supreme Court has instructed the
federal judiciary to avoid usurping the duties of arbitration panels
and defer, whenever possible, to their determinations.82 If the courts
do not accord contractual dispute settlement procedures finality,
they will undermine the system of collective bargaining.
79 Hand, 681 F.2d at 1312; Edwards, 678 F.2d at 1284-85; Flowers, 671 F.2d at 89.
80 Flowers, 671 F.2d at 90 ("section 10(b) is inapplicable both because it relates only to
administrative procedures established by Congress to resolve unfair labor practices. . . and
because it was adopted by Congress six years before the duty of fair representation was recog-
nized"); Edwards, 678 F.2d at 1285 ("§ 10(b) is applicable only to unfair labor practices and
does not cover a § 301 action as described in Mitchell and. . . there is no explicit authority to
adopt the six-month federal statute of limitations for both causes of action").
81 See Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
82 Hines, 424 U.S. at 562-63. "Otherwise 'plenary review by a court of the merits would
make meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality it would
almost never be final.'" Id at 563 (citation omitted).
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2. Methods of Dispute Resolution Which Further Employee
Interests
Recognizing that Congress has encouraged the resolution of la-
bor disputes through a contractual arbitration system,83 the Supreme
Court, too, has favored private dispute settlement. The Court be-
lieves that grievance procedures stabilize the "common law" of the
factory.8 4 The Court has likened the role of the union in the collec-
tive bargaining system to that of a legislature charged with the
weighty responsibility to protect those whom it represents.8 5 Individ-
ual employees, by subordinating their particular interests to the col-
lective interests of all,8 6 are intended to benefit from the strong
bargaining unit thereby formed.
3. Rapid and Uniform Dispute Resolutions
The private collective bargaining system's purpose is to settle
labor disputes quickly, keeping industry functioning smoothly. The
Supreme Court has stated that one of the leading policies of labor
law is the "relatively rapid disposition of labor disputes." 87 Addi-
tionally, both the Mitchell majority opinion and Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion stressed the value of uniformity in this area of the
federal law.88
B. A Proposed Clarftcation of United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell
The federal courts' continuing uncertainty concerning the time-
liness issue of the fair representation doctrine should be resolved.
The Supreme Court has consented to hear two cases involving this
judicial doctrine8 9 and thus has an ideal opportunity to clarify what
statute of limitations is "appropriate" for this kind of claim. Al-
though the following proposal narrows the Mitchell holding, it fur-
thers those policies recognized as vital to the collective bargaining
system.
83 Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
84 Id
85 See Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944).
86 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182.
87 Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 707.
88 Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 63. See also Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 67-68 (Stewart, J., concurring);
note 49 supra and accompanying text.
89 See Flowers v. Local 2602, United Steelworkers of America, 671 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1982),
cer granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1982)(No. 81-2408); Delcostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1981), aj'd, 679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1982)(No. 81-2386).
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The Court should expressly limit the Mitchell ruling on timeli-
ness to control only an employee's claim against his employer pursu-
ant to section 301 of the LMRA. The federal judiciary should be
instructed to select the appropriate state tort statute of limitations for
an employee's fair representation claim. Additionally, the Court
should specify that the presence or absence of a claim against the
employer, as well as the merits of that claim, are irrelevant to the
timeliness determination for the fair representation claim.
By so refining its fair representation doctrine, the Supreme
Court can quash the conflict in the federal courts and further the
interests of all those whom the collective bargaining system affects.
This clarification is appropriate, for as Justice Stevens and several
circuit courts have noted, the fair representation claim stems from a
theoretical basis independent of that on which the wrongful dis-
charge claim rests.90 Specifically, an employee's fair representation
claim is analogous to a basic tort claim; it could reasonably be char-
acterized as a breach of fiduciary duty or nonmedical malpractice
action.9'
This characterization will not undermine the labor law policy
supporting viable and final dispute settlements. The Supreme Court
has said that although Congress has endorsed provisions for private
arbitration, the legislature assumes that the collective bargaining sys-
tem will function "within some minimum levels of integrity. '92 Or-
dinarily the courts should defer to contractual dispute settlement
procedures, but when the collective bargaining system has broken
down, judicial deference becomes inappropriate. 93 An aggrieved em-
ployee should be able to enforce his right to fair representation, and
he should be allowed the same time in which to bring this suit as he
would have for any other similar claim of personal injury.
A similar analysis supports the conclusion that this proposal will
not harm the collective bargaining system's objective to protect em-
ployee interests. After all, the Supreme Court developed the fair rep-
resentation doctrine to safeguard employees from union misconduct.
The Court should give them a reasonable opportunity to avail them-
selves of the protection this doctrine affords.
94
90 See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 72-74 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Flowers, 671
F.2d at 89; Edwards, 678 F.2d at 1282; Hand, 681 F.2d at 1311-13. See also notes 54-60 and 75-
80 supra and accompanying text.
91 See notes 59 and 77 supra and accompanying text.
92 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
93 See id at 567, 570.
94 In Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 201 (1944), the Supreme Court stated
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I Regarding the goals of rapidity and uniformity in labor dispute
settlements, this proposal would not appear to deviate substantially
from the current state of the law. The Supreme Court stated in
Hoosier Cardinal95 that "statutes of limitations come into play only
when these [private arbitration] processes have already broken down.
Lack of uniformity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in
any important way the achievement of any significant goal of labor
policy."96 State statutes of limitations for tort actions, although cer-
tainly not as short as those for actions to vacate arbitration awards,97
are not generally of such a long duration as would endanger the la-
bor system's stability if courts refer to them for fair representation
claims.98
V. Conclusion
Created by the Supreme Court in the 1940's, the fair representa-
tion doctrine has since evolved, together with the collective bargain-
ing system. An employee may now bring suit against his employer
notwithstanding the exclusive grievance procedures for which his
union and employer have contracted, provided he can demonstrate
that his union breached its fair representation duty. Additionally,
federal courts have recognized that an employee may enforce his
right to fair representation independent of any claim he has against
his employer; the Supreme Court has directed that the liability be
apportioned between the union and employer in hybrid suits accord-
ing to the fault of each.
Conflict reigns in the federal courts, however, concerning the ap-
propriate statute of limitations for an employee's fair representation
claim. Some circuits have applied the inapposite Mitchell majority
opinion, selecting the same limitations rule for both the fair represen-
tation claim against the union and the claim against the employer.
Other circuits have adopted the approach of Justice Stewart and ap-
that the collective bargaining system's purpose is not to provide for only the interests of the
majority in any given union, but rather the system is intended to benefit all those whom the
union represents.
95 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
96 Id at 702.
97 See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 63 n.5: "New York is typical in providing a relatively short
limitations period for actions to vacate arbitration awards. Of 42 States with specific limita-
tions periods for such actions, 28 have a period of 90 days, 9 have shorter periods, 2 longer,
and 3 States have periods based on the term of court .... The Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 12, provides a limitations period of three months."
98 Significantly, in fitchell the majority would have adopted up to a six-year limitations
period had there existed a relevant New York statute. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 64.
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plied the six-month limitations rule in section 10(b) of the NLRA,
while still others have followed Justice Stevens's suggestion and cho-
sen the relevant state tort statute of limitations for the fair represen-
tation claim. This note proposes a clarification of the Mitchell
holding, consistent with Justice Stevens's approach, which would end
the controversy. The proposal is in harmony with Supreme Court
precedent, for it gives employees a reasonable opportunity to enforce
their right to fair representation. Moreover, this limitation of the
Mitchell decision upholds policies basic to labor law.
Most importantly, viewing an employee's suit for enforcement of
his statutory right to fair union representation as analogous to a per-
sonal, tort-based claim is a conceptually sound approach. The pro-
posed clarification would shore up the existing gap in the Supreme
Court's fair representation doctrine.
EmilyJ. Dark
